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Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book of His Treatise, by 
David Pears. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Reviewed by 
David A. Reidy, Jr., University of Kansas. 
In his recent book, Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book 
of his Treatise, David Pears presents David Hume not as the radical 
skeptic many have thought him to be, but rather as a "cautious naturalist" 
and a "sophisticated empiricist," a philosopher willing to give his 
epistemological stamp of approval to many of the "audacious inferences" 
ubiquitous in both science and everyday life, but unwilling, because, in the 
end, unable, to justify those inferences, save by appeal to naturalistic 
justifications. Pears likens Hume in this regard to Wittgenstein, noting 
that both acknowledged and accepted the necessity, in the final analysis, 
of a naturalistic justification for foundational epistemological claims. For 
Hume, an adequate, rational (and empirical) analysis of the reasoning 
human beings successfully use to map, manipulate and predict the world 
that spatially and temporally surrounds them must appeal to both nature 
and mind. 
If, in writing this book, Pears aimed, among other things, to sensitize 
readers to the limited and subtle nature of Hume's so-called skepticism, 
he succeeds for the most part. Pears portrays Hume as a philosopher in 
search of the psychological analog to Newton's Principia, a philosopher 
committed to discovering the "secret springs and principles" of human 
reasoning through an "experimental moral philosophy." Hume is, 
consequently, no general skeptic. His acknowledgement that it may be 
impossible to explain foundational principles of human thought in terms 
of reason makes him no more a skeptic than Newton's acknowledgement 
that it may be impossible to rationally explain the fundamental forces in 
the universe makes Newton a skeptic (Treatise, xvi-xix). Nor, Pears 
suggests, is Hume, when carefully read, the sort of narrow skeptic others 
have sometimes portrayed him to be, reserving his skepticism for 
particular claims, for example, causal inferences. Unfortunately, Pears 
does not discuss whether Hume is a skeptic with respect to, not our 
knowledge, but rather our reason as a path to that knowledge, a possibility 
afforded by Hume's argument that reason leads one to reject the 
existence of external objects, a mistake that nature will not permit. 
In this book, Pears aims to do more than reassess Hume's 
"skepticism." Several recent interpretations of Hume's work have, 
according to Pears, focused almost exclusively upon that strand of Hume's 
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thought which addresses the nature of and evidence for certain beliefs, 
e.g., the belief that the red ball must move when the white ball strikes it. 
Pears finds these interpretations problematic, for he finds Hume's thought 
equally focused upon the meaning (and meaningfulness) of certain ideas 
supposed to participate in the content of these beliefs. To be sure. Pears 
notes that Hume himself did not always distinguish carefully between the 
analysis of a claim's meaning(fulness) and the nature of and evidence for a 
belief in its veracity. Nonetheless, he argues that the two strands of 
thought are present and logically separable. Because questions of 
meaning logically precede questions of truth and evidence, any careful 
presentation of Hume's thinking. Pears argues, ought to reveal Hume's 
analysis of the former before the latter, even if Hume did not. 
Consequently, Pears aims both to offer a "balanced" interpretation of 
Hume, one that gives equal time to questions of meaning and questions of 
truth and evidence, and to present always, with respect to the particular 
issues analyzed, Hume's thinking on the former question before the latter. 
For example, when examining Hume's account of memory, before 
presenting Hume's thinking on how humans come to believe memory-
ideas. Pears first attempts to extract from Hume's work an account of the 
meaningfulness of memory-ideas, as distinct from, say, meaningless day-
dreaming image-ideas. Perhaps not surprisingly, given this method. Pears 
finds that many of the difficulties Hume encounters in Book One of the 
Treatise stem from Hume's failure to address questions of meaning prior 
to questions of evidence. 
Now, perhaps this approach is not fair to Hume. After all, it is quite 
possible, especially given Hume's heavy emphasis upon natural feelings 
and the role of images in human thought, that Hume found careful 
distinctions between questions of meaning and questions of truth 
unnecessary to his phenomenological and naturalistic study of human 
reasoning. Pears briefly considers this possibility but quickly dismisses it, 
arguing that had Hume found such distinctions unnecessary to his project, 
he was wrong. 
Here Pears reveals his two basic assumptions about the nature of 
Hume's project. First, he reads Hume as a sort of proto-twentieth-century 
analytic philosopher struggling to achieve the clarity of later thinkers in 
that tradition. Consequently, Hume's failure to disentangle questions of 
meaning from questions of truth is inexcusable. Second, Pears takes 
Hume's allusions to Newton seriously. He assumes that Hume was 
attempting, in the Treatise, to outline a complete (and Newtonian) science 
of the mental world. Thus, for Pears, the fact that Hume excludes 
language from his study, focusing instead upon thought in and through 
images, dooms Hume to failure. 
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Pears assumes, rather than arguing for, this particular view of Hume's 
project. To be sure, Book One of the Treatise, when read in isolation from 
the remainder of the Treatise and the two Enquiries, lends itself to Pears' 
view. Given this view, Pears' reading is careful, well-argued and thought-
provoking. Nonetheless, one cannot help but wonder whether it is really 
"Hume's System" that Pears examines. Arguably, one cannot completely 
and accurately examine Hume's accounts of belief and thought in Book 
One of the Treatise without paying attention to Hume's accounts of 
sentiment and natural feeling. And yet this is what Pears attempts to 
accomplish. 
Pears divides his book into two parts. In the first part, he briefly 
sketches Hume's theory of mind as it appears in Book One of the Treatise. 
Here Pears identifies and develops several almost thematic difficulties 
with Hume's thinking which, for Pears, seriously impoverish Hume's 
theory of mind. In the second part, Pears traces the application of Hume's 
theory of mind to three problems central to Book One of the Treatise: 
causation, personal identity and perception. Here Pears finds that, despite 
the "almost primitive" nature of Hume's theory of mind, Hume reaches 
profound insights regarding these three problems. With respect to each 
problem, Pears examines Hume's rejection of the "rationalist" and "naive 
empiricist" accounts, identifies what he takes to be the central weakness in 
Hume's own "sophisticated empiricist" account, traces that weakness back 
to one or more of the thematic weaknesses of Hume's theory of mind 
developed in Part One, and then offers Hume a way out of his difficulty. 
Pears begins Part One with Hume's maxim that all ideas originate in 
and are copies of impressions. Highlighting Hume's empiricism, Pears 
notes that the priority of impressions over ideas is not a logical priority, but 
rather a matter of contingent fact which Hume claims to discover through 
observation. Pears argues that like Russell's principle of acquaintance, 
Hume's maxim, in conjunction with an atomistic analysis, identifies and 
sets aside spurious ideas and meaningless claims. For example, Hume 
argues that the idea of the self as the vessel or substance unifying the 
sequence of impressions present to experience is meaningless for there is 
no, and could be no, impression from which such an idea would originate. 
But, Pears notes, Hume's maxim entails more than a theory of 
meaning and it would be a mistake to reduce it to such. For example, it 
does not isolate and set aside as spurious the free-floating (and 
semantically meaningless) image-ideas of day-dreaming. Hume's maxim 
merely identifies those entities in terms of which mental phenomena must 
be understood. For Hume, then, ideas occur sometimes as less than, 
sometimes just as and sometimes as more than "meaning-bearers." For 
example, the idea of a particular shade of blue may occur as a day-
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dreaming image; or, as a meaning-bearing idea, as when I wonder whether 
a particular neck-tie is blue; or, as part of a judgment or belief, as when I 
conclude that the neck-tie is indeed blue. Pears argues that a central 
weakness of Hume's theory of mind is just this failure to distinguish 
systematically between the occurence of ideas as mere data, as "meaning-
bearing" entities and as part of the content of beliefs or judgments. For 
Hume, the "content" of the idea in each case remains unchanged. 
Pears argues that this initial failure to distinguish the various ways in 
which ideas occur weakened Hume's overall theory of mind, as well as his 
detailed explanations of causal inference, personal identity and 
perception. For example, it forced Hume to argue that an idea occuring as 
the content of a belief differs from the same idea occuring outside the 
belief context only in the "manner" in which it presents itself to the mind, a 
notion, Pears notes, which Hume had great difficulty explicating. Had 
Hume initially distinguished between the various ways in which ideas 
occur in mental phenomena, he would have produced, Pears argues, a 
more sophisticated, complete and fertile theory of mind. Specifically, 
Pears suggests, had Hume reflected upon beliefs, he would have realized 
that beliefs persist through time and influence action, unlike passing 
thoughts or day-dreaming images. In other words, had Hume been more 
careful, he would have noticed the uniquely dispositional nature of belief-
ideas and analyzed them accordingly. 
But here Pears seems to miss a part of Hume's system. Pears is 
correct, to be sure, that Hume apparently understands "belief as a 
passive mental event. But this does not explain why Hume appears 
untroubled in the Treatise by his remark to the effect that while he could 
not exactly explicate what he meant by the "manner" in which a belief-idea 
forces itself upon a mind, he was certain that his readers would know to 
what he was referring (Treatise, 106, 624). Hume could say this without 
apparent difficulty, in large part, because for Hume the "peculiar 
something" which attends to belief-ideas and distinguishes them from 
other ideas is a "natural" feeling, a force, perhaps unexplainable through 
reason, naturally present in all human minds. That Pears interprets 
Hume's inability to explicate in detail that which distinguishes belief-ideas 
from other ideas as a "failure of the science of the human mind" from 
which Hume must be saved (Pears, 50) evidences both Pears' unargued for 
understanding of Hume's project and his insensitivity to the possibility 
that Hume is genuinely skeptical about reason itself. Pears never really 
reflects on why Hume indeed may not have been troubled by his inability 
to explicate more fully the peculiar nature of beliefs. Instead he uses this 
inability primarily as a springboard from which to leap to twentieth-
century issues. 
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A second and related weakness of Hume's theory of mind which Pears 
develops focuses upon Hume's "atomism." For Hume, a simple idea, like 
a simple impression, is that which cannot be further divided. For example, 
both the impression and subsequently formed idea of the taste of a 
particular orange are simple. Complex ideas either copy complex 
impressions (the shape, color and smell of the orange united in one 
impression) or arise (a "vertical" movement) from the conjunction of 
simple ideas (which copy simple impressions). Pears analogizes this 
"atomistic" tendency in Hume's thinking to Russell's logical atomism and 
Wittgenstein's early work. Like Russell and early Wittgenstein, however, 
by focusing exclusively upon the intrinsic features of impressions and 
ideas and thereby cutting himself off from their extrinsic features 
(including lateral relations among them), Hume finds himself unable to 
explain certain phenomena. 
Indeed, Hume confesses his inability to explain an individual's ability 
to form, without a prior impression, the idea of a particular shade of blue 
missing from an appropriately formed color wheel of various shades of 
blue. Hume, however, simply dismisses this objection to his maxim. 
Dissatisfied, Pears offers Hume a way out of this difficulty. Pears suggests 
that Hume allow for certain ideas to be derived from impressions in ways 
other than copying and conjoining; specifically, they may be derived 
horizontally from the lateral, extrinsic relations among impressions. To 
save his empiricism, Pears argues, Hume must sacrifice his strict atomism. 
Now, the value of Pears' contribution to Hume's thought here 
notwithstanding (Hume does need some way, consistent with his maxim, 
to explain the origin of ideas such as "betweenness"), it is unfortunate that 
again Pears fails to reflect on why Hume would dismiss this obvious 
objection to his maxim so easily. Pears misses a real opportunity to reflect 
on Hume's system. Instead, Pears moves directly on to solving the 
problem with Hume's thought. 
It is also unfortunate that Pears does not reflect upon how his 
proposed solution to Hume's missing shade of blue problem might alter 
the Humean understanding of "experience." For Hume, 
phenomenological simples ultimately constitute experience. Hume 
presumably arrived at this view empirically. Pears is unclear about 
whether his solution to Hume's missing shade of blue problem entails a 
broader understanding of experience, one in which "relational properties" 
simply present themselves to the mind as fundamental constituents of 
experience. If so, Pears, perhaps, comes too close to sacrificing Hume's 
particular brand of empiricism to avoid the obligation to provide a more 
detailed analysis on this point than he provides. 
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A third weakness in Hume's thinking related to both his failure to 
distinguish between the various modes in which ideas occur and his 
atomism is, for Pears, Hume's tendency to assimilate the active, 
purposeful, and directed thinking that takes place when one forms a 
judgment to the passive, non-directed thinking that takes place when one 
merely entertains a notion. For example, this failure to distinguish 
between active and passive thought made it difficult for Hume to 
articulate a coherent account of memory and imagination. Pears notes 
that Hume, at the outset, is not clear whether he means for "memory" to 
refer to an activity of the mind (remembering) or to the content of an idea 
passively present to the mind (a memory). Hume's account of memory 
fails, Pears argues, as an explanation of the sort of directed thought which 
takes place when one purposefully recollects a particular event. The only 
plausible distinction between the memory-idea present to my mind in 
such a case and an otherwise identical imagination-idea is that the former 
actually refers to some past impression or idea of mine while the latter 
does not. For Hume, however, it will often be the case that both the 
memory-idea and the imagination-idea are simple and unanalyzeable, 
making it impossible to explain why a memory-idea refers while an 
imagination-idea does not. Again, Pears suggests, the "primitive" nature of 
Hume's theory forces Hume to rely upon almost unintelligible notions 
such as force and vivacity. 
This failure to incorporate into his theory of mind this distinction 
between active and passive thought also weakened Hume's analysis of 
general, abstract ideas. Hume argued that a general, abstract idea, say of 
a triangle, must acquire its generality from the "term" to which it attaches, 
for example, the word "triangle," because the idea-image present to the 
mind will be always of a particular triangle, as it is impossible for the mind 
to have had an impression of a general and abstract triangle, and any 
particular idea-image may support multiple general significations. Pears, 
quite correctly, notes that Hume does not explain here the difficult nature 
of general, abstract ideas; he merely displaces it. Hume does not explain 
how the term "triangle" signifies the generality of an abstract idea. Pears 
does not find this surprising. He argues that any such explanation must 
refer to intentions, and Hume's tendency to understand thinking as a 
passive rather than active process (as well as Hume's atomism) makes it 
unlikely Hume will offer such an explanation. 
Because Pears finds Hume tacitly relying throughout his theory of 
mind upon unexamined features of language (e.g., reference and 
intentionality), Pears claims that the best interpretive strategy when 
reading Hume is to be ready to make the adjustments to Hume's theory 
necessary to save as much of his thought as possible. Pears does not ask 
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whether, if pressed, Hume might not have conceded tacit reliance upon 
unexamined features of language and argued that such reliance was not 
particularly relevant to his project, a question perhaps necessary to an 
"examination" of "Hume's System." If Hume intended only to articulate 
the philosophical foundations of a science devoted to explaining mental 
phenomena as events analogous to physical events (i.e., they just happen), 
perhaps noting that general ideas receive their generality from the terms 
to which they attach sufficiently explains such ideas. As Pears himself 
notes, Hume's object of study was thought as an observable event, not 
language. While Pears and contemporary readers may recognize the 
inseparability of thought and language, it is, perhaps, unfair to demand 
that Hume recognize this too. In any event, Pears aims in his reading of 
Hume's accounts of causal inference, personal identity and perception to 
first indicate the impressive ground Hume was able to cover with his 
"primitive" theory of mind and then, utilizing the resources now available 
to analytic philosophy, to "save" as much of Hume's account of each 
problem as possible. 
Hume notes correctly the gap between the evidence for and content 
of causal inferences. Hume, however, distinguishing himself from earlier 
thinkers, did not try to close that gap. Rather, he explains our movement 
from evidence to causal belief in naturalistic terms. 
The evidence in support of a causal inference never exceeds 
impressions, specifically the constant conjunction of impressions related 
by resemblance and contiguity. Despite this meager evidence, human 
beings routinely infer, when the red ball strikes the white ball, that the red 
ball must move. Hume rejects the "rationalist's" argument justifying such 
audacious inferences. A priori reasoning, being limited to the relations 
among ideas (all of which originate in impressions), cannot account for the 
"audacious" causal inferences human beings routinely make (the content 
of which exceeds the impossibility of mountains without a valley). Hume 
also rejects the "naive empiricist's" argument that causal inference rests 
upon the impression of causal necessity at work in either the physical or 
mental world. Hume simply finds no such impression. 
Pears finds Hume's arguments against rationalism and naive 
empiricism compelling. As an aside, Pears notes that Hume does not 
therefore deserve the label skeptic. Indeed, from Hume's side, it is the 
rationalist and naive empiricist that deserve that label, for they require 
belief in something never available to the human mind. Pears does not 
find as compelling, however, Hume's own constructive account of causal 
inference. 
For example, Pears argues that Hume fails to explain how one could 
believe a hypothetical causal statement. A hypothetical causal statement 
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will always lack a present impression from which it can derive the vivacity 
necessary, on Hume's account, for belief-status. Hume also fails, Pears 
argues, to explain the ability to review rationally one's causal inferences, 
adjusting inferences to the available evidence. Both difficulties stem from 
Hume's tendency to disregard purposeful, directed thought in favor of 
passive thought. 
Hume's constructive account suffers, according to Pears, from more 
serious defects, however. Hume argues that the idea of causal necessity is 
derived from an internal impression of the constraint or necessity 
attendant to the mind's determinations as it, relying upon the "associative 
track" laid down by the constant conjunction of impressions of type A with 
impressions of type B, infers from the appearance of an impression of type 
A the subsequent appearance of an impression of type B. Pears notes that 
many have struggled to make sense of this "internal impression of 
necessity." Stroud, for example, argues that the notion cannot be 
explicated. The idea and impression of necessity each appear to derive 
their respective identity and content from the other. 
Indeed Hume does appear to be in trouble here. On the one hand, 
Hume finds no simple impression "of necessity," as either a mental or 
physical phenomena. On the other hand, Hume does identify a "feeling" 
of constraint attendant to causal inference; he recognized a difference 
between guessing and inferring. Hume's resources, however, specifically 
his maxim and atomism, Pears argues, simply left him unable to explicate 
from that "feeling" the origin of a meaningful idea of causal necessity. 
Unable to dismiss Hume's "internal impression of necessity" as hopelessly 
meaningless, Pears sets out to save as much of this notion as possible. 
Pears argues that Hume should not have set out to locate the origin of 
the idea of causal necessity in a simple impression of necessity, as if he 
were searching for the origin of the idea of a particular shade of blue in an 
impression of a particular shade of blue. Unlike the idea of a particular 
shade of blue, the idea of causal necessity is relational. Hume should have 
seen this, Pears argues, because the "feeling" of constraint Hume 
identifies is a relational property involving propositions and our attitudes 
toward them in specific contexts, specifically, the "powerlessness" of the 
will in certain contexts in relation to the propositional content of causal 
inferences. To make sense of the idea of necessity (like the idea of the 
shade of blue missing from the color wheel), Pears argues, Hume must 
allow that certain ideas originate horizontally from extrinsic and lateral 
relations among impressions. 
Overall, although weighed down by excessive listing and repetition, 
Pears' book is carefully written. He protects well his interpretation of 
Hume and his arguments on particular issues throughout. As a bridge 
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between Hume and twentieth-century analytic philosophy, the book works 
reasonably well. Unfortunately, the book brings Hume into the twentieth-
century to the almost complete exclusion of taking the twentieth-century 
reader back to Hume. 
